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Abstract
We present the application of a known subfield lattice attack on a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme based on NTRU. It is known that for this attack to be successful, a
parameter of the scheme must satisfy a lower bound. We derive a second lower bound
on the same parameter and show that this bound must be respected if the scheme is to
be functional, and furthermore that, in all practical instances of the scheme, the derived
second lower bound is greater than the lower bound required for the attack to be applicable.
Hence, the scheme is shown to be susceptible to the subfield lattice attack, and furthermore
that this susceptibility is inevitable given the current structure of the scheme.
1 Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes are encryption schemes with the following prop-
erty: for any function f , Dec(f(c)) = f(Dec(c)), where c = Enc(m) for a message m. The
first such scheme was presented in 2009 [4], and several schemes have been presented since.
They mostly follow the same structure and have the same starting point: an encryption scheme
where both multiplication and addition of freshly generated ciphertexts are homomorphic:
Dec(Enc(m1) + Enc(m2)) = m1 +m2, and Dec(Enc(m1)Enc(m2)) = m1m2.
All these schemes add bounded randomness to the plaintext to obscure it; this randomness
is also referred to as ’noise’. The problem is that as more operations are performed on a
ciphertext, this noise may grow until it no longer respects the required bounds. At this point,
the noise is said to have become unmanageable, as we have no guarantee of correct decryption
and the scheme is merely somewhat homomorphic.
In order to have a fully homomorphic scheme, we must reduce the noise, which is usually
achieved through a combination of operations. These may stunt the growth of noise, or reduce
it slightly. When these no longer suffice, bootstrapping is applied: a homomorphic evaluation of
the decryption algorithm. Bootstrapping reduces the noise sufficiently to allow for homomorphic
evaluation of any function - it is, however, a very time-consuming procedure. It is, therefore,
preferable to construct a fully homomorphic scheme by relying on other strategies and using
bootstrapping only as a last resort, as a scheme heavily dependent on bootstrapping is very
impractical.
In some cases, the somewhat homomorphic ’starting schemes’ are based on previously known
schemes, but with different parameter settings, which may result in a less secure scheme. We
present one such case, namely a FHE scheme based on NTRU, presented in [7]. We also present
an employable attack, described fully in [1]. However, the article [1] only describes the attack,
without noting that it may be applied to the NTRU-based fully homomorphic encryption scheme
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discussed here. We show this, and also how the susceptibility of this attack is inevitable. This
is done by rigorously deriving a lower bound on a crucial parameter of the encryption scheme,
and showing that this bound must be satisfied if the scheme is to be functional. Furthermore,
it is noted that another lower bound on the same parameter must be met for the attack to be
applicable, and finally that this lower bound is typically smaller than the lower bound derived
from the scheme itself. It follows that the scheme may be attacked in all practical instances of
it.
It is important to note that it is the derived lower bound which makes the scheme vulnerable
to the subfield lattice attack, and furthermore that this lower bound is a result of the additional
noise-reducing operations of the scheme. In particular, this means that the original NTRU
encryption scheme does not share the same vulnerability to this attack.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
All vectors are row vectors and will be denoted with bold lower case letters: v,w, while matri-
ces will be denoted using bold upper case letters: A,B. Elements of either a vector, a matrix
or a (polynomial) ring will be denoted with a lower case letter in italics: a, b. Vectors will be
written as a = [a1, a2, . . . , an], whereas sets will be denoted by {0, 1, . . . }.
Multiplication of integers, or an integer and a vector or polynomial is denoted by simple juxta-
position: ab, av, af(x). Multiplication of a vector and a matrix will be denoted by a single dot:
v ·A, and finally, the multiplication of two polynomials will be denoted by an asterisk: f ∗ g.
Furthermore, this polynomial multiplication always takes place in some polynomial ring, and
the main motivation of the multiplicative notation is to serve as a reminder of this during com-
putations. It should be clear from the context whether or not a given element is a polynomial,
and any polynomial f will therefore, with very few exceptions, not be written f(x).
Let v,w be vectors of the same length k over a polynomial ring R. We then define the dot
product of these two vectors as 〈v,w〉 = ∑ki=1 vi ∗ wi ∈ R. In addition, we have the following
notation: for any two polynomials a =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i, b =
∑n−1
i=0 bix
i, let [a, b] denote the vector
[a0, . . . , an−1, b0, . . . , bn−1].
We operate with the two following modular reductions: p = r mod q reduces p modulo q
to r ∈ (−q/2, q/2], whilst p = r mod q denotes the modular reduction to r ∈ [0, q − 1]. Note
that the only difference in the notation is the underlining of the first mod. In both cases, we
may also write p ≡ r mod q or p ≡ r mod q if we wish to stress that p is equivalent to r modulo
q: p = r + kq, for k ∈ Z. This generalizes to vectors and polynomials.
The Euclidean norm of a vector v is denoted by ‖v‖ =
√
v21 + v
2
2 + · · ·+ v2n , whilst ‖ · ‖∞
denotes the infinity norm: ‖v‖∞ = max
i
{|vi|}. Supposing f is a polynomial, ‖f‖, ‖f‖∞ refers
to calculating either norm of the coefficient vector of f .
For a probability distribution χ, x ← χ refers to drawing x according to χ. Furthermore,
any logarithm log will be to the base 2.
Finally, throughout this paper, the following lemma will prove quite useful. Here, R = Z[x]/f(x)
for a polynomial f of degree n.
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Lemma 2.1. The following bound holds for any two elements a, b ∈ R:
‖a ∗ b‖∞ ≤ n‖a‖∞‖b‖∞.
Proof. Seeing as ai ≤ ‖a‖∞, bi ≤ ‖b‖∞ ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, it follows that aibj ≤ ‖a‖∞‖b‖∞.
Since every coefficient of a∗b is the sum of n terms aibj , it holds that ‖a∗b‖∞ ≤ n‖a‖∞‖b‖∞.
2.2 Lattices
Definition 2.2. Let {v1,v2, . . . ,vη} be a set of linearly independent vectors, with vi ∈ Rm
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , η}. The lattice L generated by v1,v2, . . . ,vη is the set of linear combinations of
these vectors with coefficients in Z:
L = {a1v1 + a2v2 + · · ·+ aηvη : a1, a2, . . . , aη ∈ Z}.
A basis for the lattice L is any set of independent vectors that generates L, and any two
such sets will have the same dimension. Suppose m = η, we may then represent a basis by a
square matrix (where the basis vectors form the rows of the matrix) and so we may calculate
the determinant of it. There are of course many possible bases of a lattice L, but as Proposition
7.14 of [6] shows, any two bases of a lattice are related by an integer matrix with determinant
±1. It follows from this that for any two basis matrices B,B′ we have: |det(B)| = |det(B′)|.
Based on this, we have the following lattice invariant:
Definition 2.3. Let L be a lattice of dimension η with basis B = {v1,v2, . . . ,vη}, where
vi ∈ Rη ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , η}. The determinant of L is defined as
det(L) = |det(B)|.
Any vector v ∈ L has a (Euclidean) length. Given this property, we may formulate the
shortest vector problem of a lattice L [6]:
The shortest vector problem (SVP): Find a shortest nonzero vector in a lattice L, i.e. find a
nonzero vector v ∈ L that minimizes ‖v‖.
It may be shown that solving SVP is NP-hard under the randomized reduction hypothesis
[6]. Due to this proven hardness, SVP is used in cryptographic settings, so that breaking an
encryption scheme requires solving SVP for a certain instance. However, solving SVP precisely
is not always necessary; in some cases, it may suffice to compute merely an approximation of
the vectors in question; that is, solving the following problem [6]:
Approximate-SVP: Let ψ(η) be a function of the lattice dimension η of a lattice L, with ‖v0‖
the length of the shortest vectors in L. Find a vector v ∈ L such that ‖v‖ ≤ ψ(η)‖v0‖.
Of course, the length of the shortest vector v0 ∈ L is not always given, but an upper bound
on ‖v0‖ is always given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4 (Hermite’s Theorem (Theorem 7.25 [6])). Every lattice L of dimension η has at
least one vector v ∈ L satisfying ‖v‖ ≤ √η det(L)1/η.
Another result by Hermite is that for every lattice L of dimension η there exists a Hermite
constant, γη, such that ‖v0‖ ≤ √γη det(L)1/η. This constant is generally not known. However,
we may use the expression to rephrase the approximate-SVP into the Hermite Shortest Vector
Problem [3]:
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HSVP: Given a lattice L and an approximation factor α > 0, find a non-zero vector v ∈ L such
that ‖v‖ ≤ αdet(L)1/η.
The approximation factor α may be expressed as δη, in which case δ is known as the Hermite
root factor.
Of course, a solution to any of these problems is seldom apparent given a basis B for a
lattice, and the most efficient way of solving any of the presented problems is to find a basis
which contains the solution of either stated problem. This is known as basis reduction, and the
main algorithms are LLL and a generalisation of it, BKZ, both of which are HSVP-algorithms
[3].
LLL works by swapping two vectors in the basis and performing a reduction, whereas BKZ
works similarly, only with more than two vectors. The number of vectors BKZ works with is
known as the block size, denoted by β. The larger β is, the more precise the result of BKZ will
be. Although the algorithms are not fully understood, it is known that BKZ outperforms LLL.
BKZ also performs much better, both with respect to time and the resulting approximation
factors, than any theoretical bound predicts.
2.3 An Introduction to NTRU and its Security
The original NTRU encryption scheme [5] is defined over the polynomial ring Z[x]/(xN −1) for
an integer N . The integer q > 1 is an additional parameter of the scheme, as most operations
are performed modulo q.
A complete description of the NTRU-based FHE scheme to be presented in section 4 may
be found in [7]. The scheme follows the general structure of NTRU quite closely. The secret
key of the scheme is a polynomial f ← χ, for a distribution χ over R, and we require f to be
invertible modulo q. The public key is defined as h = f−1 ∗ g mod q, for g ← χ. The main
difference in the setup is that this scheme is defined over the polynomial ring R = Z[x]/(xn+1),
where we require n = 2k.
A possible attack is to try to find the secret key f based solely on the public information q
and h, and one way to do this is to reformulate the problem into one related to lattices. This
is done by constructing a 2n × 2n basis matrix for a lattice LNTRU. For an NTRU public key
polynomial h(x) = h0 + · · ·+ hn−1xn−1, the basis matrix of the lattice LNTRU is:
BNTRU =

1 0 . . . 0 h0 h1 . . . hn−1
0 1 . . . 0 −hn−1 h0 . . . hn−2
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 1 −h1 −h2 . . . h0
0 0 . . . 0 q 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 q . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . q

.
Recall that h = g ∗ f−1 and f ∗ f−1 = 1 + qf ′, so we must have f ∗ h = g + qu for some
polynomial u = g ∗ f ′.
Proposition 2.5. For the polynomials f, g and u described above, we have: [f,−u] ·BNTRU =
[f, g].
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Proof. The n first coefficients of the resulting vector of [f,−u] ·BNTRU are obviously f . Coef-
ficient n+ 1 + k, for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . n− 1} is expressed as:
n−1∑
i,j=0
i+j=k
fihj −
n−1∑
i,j=0
i+j=k+n
fihj − quk = gk + quk − quk = gk,
where the fact that xn ≡ −1 in R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) has been applied. Hence, [f,−u] ·BNTRU =
[f, g], meaning [f, g] belongs to LNTRU, as the vector may be expressed as a linear combination
of the basis vectors of LNTRU using only integers.
Supposing [f, g] is among the shortest vectors in the lattice LNTRU, it follows that if an
adversary is able to solve SVP in LNTRU, she is able to compute f based solely on public
information, and thus break the scheme. Furthermore, any pair of polynomials [f¯ , g¯] with
sufficiently small coefficients satisfying the relation f¯ ∗ h = g¯ mod q will also suffice, as will
probably any solution to approximate-SVP for an approximation factor smaller than
√
n [6].
Thus, recovering the secret key f of the encryption scheme reduces to solving approximate-SVP
or HSVP for the lattice LNTRU. We stress again that for this strategy to work, we require the
vector [f, g] to be among the shortest vectors in the lattice LNTRU.
3 Subfield Lattice Attack
There may be more efficient attacks than merely applying LLL or BKZ on the lattice basis,
depending on the properites of the scheme. We present one such attack here, described fully in
[1].
3.1 Algebraic Background
Let K = Q[ω] be a field, for a root of unity ω of order 2n, for n a power of 2, and let L
be a subfield of K such that L = Q[ω′], for ω′ a root of unity of order 2n′, where n′ also is
a power of 2, and define ρ = n/n′. These fields will have rings of integers Z[ω] and Z[ω′],
respectively. These rings of integers may be shown to be isomorphic to the polynomial rings
R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) and R′ = Z[x]/(xn′ + 1).[1]
We know from Galois theory that there is a Galois group G′ of automorphisms {ϕi} on
K that fixes L pointwise [1]. Using these automorphisms, we may define the norm function
NK/L : K→ L, as NK/L(a) =
∏
ϕi∈G′ ϕi(a).
3.2 The Attack
Given an instance of an NTRU-based encryption scheme, with sk = f and pk = h = f−1 ∗ g,
we define f ′ = NK/L(f), g′ = NK/L(g), h′ = NK/L(h) and a new lattice L′NTRU defined by h′
and q as described in Subsection 2.3. The approach of the attack is to find a short vector
[x′, y′] ∈ L′NTRU by performing LLL on the basis B′NTRU and lift this vector up to [x, y] in
the original lattice, using the canonical inclusion map. If the vector [x′, y′] satisfies certain
properties, the vector [x, y] will be short in LNTRU, and might therefore function as a secret
key.
The actual attack rests on the following heuristic:
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Heuristic 3.1 (Heuristic 1 [1]). For any n and any f, g ∈ R with reasonable isotropic distribu-
tion of variance σ2 and any constant c > 0, there exists a constant C such that ‖f ′‖ ≤ (σnC)ρ
and ‖g′‖ ≤ (σnC)ρ, except with probability O(n−c).
Moreover, Theorem 1 of [1] assures us of the existence of a lattice reduction algorithm with
block-size β which is able to find a vector [x′, y′] ∈ R′ such that ‖[x′, y′]‖ ≤ βΘ(2n′/β)‖v0‖
when applied to the basis of the lattice L′NTRU, with ‖v0‖ the length of the shortest vectors in
the lattice. When combined with the observation that ‖v0‖ ≤ ‖[f ′, g′]‖ and Heuristic 3.1, we
conclude that there exists a lattice reduction algorithm able to find a vector [x′, y′] ∈ R′ such
that
‖[x′, y′]‖ ≤ βΘ(n/βρ)‖[f ′, g′]‖ ≤ βΘ(n/βρ)(nσ)Θ(ρ).
Furthermore, we also have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 (Theorem 2 [1]). Let f ′, g′ ∈ R′ be such that 〈f ′〉 and 〈g′〉 are coprime ideals1
and h′ ∗ f ′ = g′ mod q for some h′ ∈ R′. If [x′, y′] ∈ L′NTRU has length satisfying
‖[x′, y′]‖ < q‖[f ′, g′]‖ , (1)
then [x′, y′] = v[f ′, g′] for some v ∈ R′.
Based on the result derived from Heuristic 3.1 and Theorem 1 from [1], we conclude that
for bound (1) to hold, and therefore for the attack to succeed, we must require
βΘ(n/βρ)(nσ)Θ(ρ) ≤ q. (2)
Once the vector [x′, y′] has been found, we lift x′, y′ ∈ R′ to R using the canonical inclusion
map L : L→ K:
x = L(x′) = L(v) ∗ L(f ′),
y = L(y′) ∗ h/L(h′) mod q = L(v) ∗ L(g′) ∗ h/L(h′) mod q,
Here, v is as in Theorem 3.2. For simplicity, we set f˜ = L(f ′)/f , g˜ = L(g′)/g and h˜ = L(h′)/h;
we then have
x = L(v) ∗ f˜ ∗ f mod q
y = L(v) ∗ L(g′)/h˜ = L(v) ∗ g ∗ g˜/h˜ = L(v) ∗ f˜ ∗ g mod q
⇒ [x, y] = u ∗ [f, g] ∈ LNTRU with u = L(v) ∗ f˜ ∈ R.
In other words: the subfield attack yields a (small) multiplicative of [f, g] under certain reason-
able assumptions.
4 A Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
based on NTRU
4.1 The Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the encryption scheme presented here is fully described in [7] and
is defined over the polynomial ring R = Z[x]/(xn + 1), for n a power of 2. We also have the
1The authors of [1] note that the probability of 〈f ′〉 and 〈g′〉 being coprime is roughly 3/4, and also that it
does not seem strictly necessary for the attack to be successful in practice.
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integer parameters q, p, chosen such that q  p ≥ 2 and gcd(p, q) = 1. Given these integers,
we define the rings Rp = Zp[x]/(xn + 1) and Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1). In addition, we have a
probability distribution χ, which will typically be some discrete Gaussian distribution. The
scheme consists of the following operations:
KeyGen: Draw f ← χ such that f ≡ 1 mod p and ∃f−1 mod q. Draw g ← χ as well, and
output pk = h = g ∗ f−1 mod q and sk = f .
Enc(pk = h,m ∈ Rp): Draw e, r ← χ such that e ≡ m mod p.
Output c = pr ∗ h+ e mod q, d = 1.
Dec(sk = f, c ∈ Rq, d): Compute b¯ = fd ∗ c mod q and lift this to the integer polynomial b ∈ R
with coefficients in (−q/2, q/2]. Output m = b mod p.
EvalAdd(c0, c1, d0, d1): Output: c = c0 + c1 mod q, d = max(d0, d1).
EvalMult(c0, c1, d0, d1): Output: c = c0 ∗ c1 mod q, d = d0 + d1.
The two last operations are the homomorphic operations, and it is also these that necessitate
the notion of the degree d of a ciphertext, which denotes the power of f−1 in the ciphertext.
Note that fk ∗ b = m mod p for any power k ≥ 0, whilst this is not necessarily the case for
f−1, as there is no guarantee that f−1 = 1 mod p. Therefore, the decryption procedure will
decrypt any ciphertext of degree at most the given d, assuming fd ∗ c = fk ∗ b mod q, which is
the reason d = max(d0, d1) in EvalAdd.
The polynomials f, g, r and e must be chosen so that they ensure correct decryption -
meaning χ should have parameters ensuring that these polynomials are ”short enough”. What
precisely this entails will be discussed at some length throughout this section. Essentially: we
will derive bounds on the coefficients of these polynomials to ensure correct decryption, even
after the noise reducing operations have been performed on a ciphertext. The resulting bounds
will be used to derive a final bound on q.
We start with the lower bound imposed on the coefficients of the polynomials f, g, r and e
to ensure correct decryption of a freshly generated ciphertext.
Proposition 4.1. In order for the presented encryption scheme to correctly decrypt a freshly
generated ciphertext, we require every coefficient of the polynomials f, g, r and e to be strictly
less than
√
q
4pn .
Proof. The decryption of c = pr ∗h+e mod q proceeds as follows, when viewed as an operation
in R, as opposed to Rq:
b¯ = f ∗ c = f ∗ (pr ∗ h+ e) = pf ∗ r ∗ g ∗ f−1 + f ∗ e
= pq ∗ r ∗ g ∗ f ′ + pr ∗ g + f ∗ e,
where f ∗ f−1 = qf ′ + 1. Consider the polynomial pr ∗ g + f ∗ e in R. To ensure correct
decryption, we need every coefficient of this polynomial to be of absolute value less than q/2,
or else we get b = pr ∗ g + f ∗ e − q∑n−1i=0 aixi where some ai 6= 0 and hence, b mod p need
not equal m. We therefore require ‖pr ∗ g + f ∗ e‖∞ < q/2. Using the triangle inequality and
Lemma 2.1, we may compute:
‖pr ∗ g + f ∗ e‖∞ ≤ ‖pr ∗ g‖∞ + ‖f ∗ e‖∞
≤ pn‖r‖∞‖g‖∞ + n‖f‖∞‖e‖∞
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≤ pn‖r‖∞‖g‖∞ + pn‖f‖∞‖e‖∞ ≤ 2pnB2, (3)
for B a bound on the largest coefficient of r, g, f and e. If we assume (3) is less than q/2, then
any fresh ciphertext will decrypt correctly. This requires the polynomials r, g, f and e to be
sampled from a distribution χ which ensures that any coefficient is strictly less than
√
q
4pn .
4.2 Noise reductions
The scheme in [7] uses key switching, ring reduction, modulus switching and bootstrapping
as strategies to reduce the noise of a ciphertext, and thus turn the somewhat homomorphic
scheme into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. However, only key switching and modulus
switching are being performed after every multiplication; hence we shall only focus on these
two operations.
Note that this, strictly speaking, only makes the scheme presented here somewhat homo-
morphic, as we need bootstrapping to make it truly fully homomorphic. Nevertheless, we refer
to the scheme presented here as a fully homomorphic scheme, mainly to separate it from the
”starting scheme” presented in Subsection 4.1, and refer the interested reader to [7] to study
the bootstrapping procedure.
4.2.1 Key Switching
Key switching converts a ciphertext of degree at most d encrypted under f1 into a ciphertext
of degree 1 encrypted under the secret key f2. This procedure requires a hint, namely a1→2 =
a¯ ∗ fd1 ∗ f−12 mod q, for χ → a¯ ≡ 1 mod p. Based on this hint, the actual key switching is the
procedure
KeySwitch(c1, a1→2): Output: c2 = a1→2 ∗ c1 mod q.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose c1 is an encryption of m under f1 of degree d which decrypts
correctly: Dec(f1, c1, d) = m. In order to ensure Dec(f2, c2, 1) = m, for a1→2 and c2 generated
according to the above procedure, we require every coefficient of f1, f2, g, r, e and a¯ to be strictly
less than ( q
2d+1pdn2d
)
1
2d+1 .
Proof. Decryption of c2 results in:
b¯2 = f2 ∗ c2 = f2 ∗ a1→2 ∗ c1 = f2 ∗ a¯ ∗ fd1 ∗ f−12 ∗ c1
≡ a¯ ∗ fd1 ∗ c1 ≡ a¯ ∗ b¯1 mod q
In order to have correct decryption, we require ‖a¯ ∗ b¯1‖∞ < q/2, to ensure that b2 = a¯ ∗ b1 =
a¯ ∗ m = m mod p. Seeing as c1 is a ciphertext of degree d, it must be the result of d − 1
multiplications, wlog let b¯1 = f
d
1 ∗ (pr∗g ∗f−11 +e)d mod q. For the assumption ‖a¯∗ b¯1‖∞ < q/2
to hold, we must have:
‖a¯ ∗ fd1 ∗ (pr ∗ g ∗ f−11 + e)d‖∞ = ‖a¯ ∗ fd1 ∗
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
piri ∗ gi ∗ f−i1 ∗ ed−i‖∞
= ‖a¯ ∗
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
piri ∗ gi ∗ fd−i1 ∗ ed−i‖∞
By Lemma 2.1 ≤ n2d‖a¯‖∞
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
pi‖r‖i∞‖g‖i∞‖f‖d−i∞ ‖e‖d−i∞
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≤ pdn2dB2d+1
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
≤ 2dpdn2dB2d+1 < q/2.
Here, B is a bound on the largest coefficient in a¯, r, g, f and e, and the requirement of this being
strictly less than ( q
2d+1pdn2d
)
1
2d+1 to ensure correct decryption after switching keys immediately
follows.
It follows that key switching should be performed after every multiplication to minimize this
bound. In the case d = 2 we have:
B5 <
q
8p2n4
. (4)
4.2.2 Modulus Switching
Modulus switching converts a ciphertext from modulus q to a smaller modulus, q¯ = q/q′ for some
factor q′ of q, which reduces the underlying noise by a factor of approximately q′. Seeing as q′|q,
it follows that gcd(q′, p) = 1⇒ ∃v s.t. v = (q′)−1 mod p. The procedure ModSwitch(c, q, q′) is
performed as follows:
1. Compute a short % ∈ R such that % = c mod q′.
2. Compute a short ∆ ∈ R such that ∆ = (q′v − 1)% mod (pq′).
3. Let %′ = c+ ∆ mod q. Note that q′ divides %′ by construction.
4. Output c′ = (%′/q′) ∈ Rq¯.
Note that the final step indirectly multiplies % with v, which may easily be compensated for by
either multiplying with q′ in the final step of the decryption procedure or ensuring that q′ ≡ 1
mod p.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose c is an encryption of degree 1 of the message m under the secret key
f . Let c′ = ModSwitch(c, q, q′); then, in order to have vDec(f, c, 1) = Dec(f, c′, 1), we require
every coefficient of f, g, r and e to be less than or equal to B, which again needs to satisfy
1
q′ (2pnB
2 + nB pq
′
2 ) <
q
2q′
Proof. Let q¯ = q/q′. As % = c mod q′ and v = (q′)−1 mod p, we may write
% = c− q′l for l ∈ R, q′v = 1 + pk for k ∈ Z.
Following the procedure, we have2:
(q′v − 1)% = (pk + 1− 1)(c− q′l) = pk(c− q′l) = pkc− pq′kl.
⇒ ∆ = pkc− pq′s for s ∈ R, as R 3 ∆ = (q′v − 1)% ≡ pkc mod pq′.
%′ = c+ ∆ mod q = c+ pkc− pq′s = (1 + pk)c− pq′s
≡ q′vc− pq′s mod q.
c′ = %′/q′ ≡ vc− ps mod q¯.
2Throughout this proof, pk denotes p multiplied with k, not the public key.
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In order to guarantee correct decryption, we require ‖vc− ps‖∞ < q¯/2, so that:
f ∗ c′ = vf ∗ c− pf ∗ s = v(pr ∗ g(qf ′ + 1) + f ∗ e)− pf ∗ s ∈ R
≡ vpg ∗ r + vf ∗ e− pf ∗ s mod q¯
If we are to have equality rather than equivalence, we must have ‖vf ∗e+vpg∗r−pf ∗s‖∞ < q¯/2,
so that: (f ∗ c′ mod q¯) mod p = vm. Thus, for the decryption of c′ to be successful, we need to
have the following:
‖f ∗ c′‖∞ = ‖f ∗ (c+ ∆)/q′‖∞ ≤ 1
q′
(‖f ∗ c)‖∞ + ‖f ∗∆‖∞)
We use c = p ∗ r ∗ g ∗ f−1 + e as well as Lemma 2.1 and derive:
1
q′
(‖pg ∗ r + f ∗ e‖∞ + ‖f ∗∆‖∞) ≤ 1
q′
(2pnB2 + nB‖∆‖∞)
≤ 1
q′
(2pnB2 + nB
pq′
2
) < q/2q′. (5)
4.3 ComposedEvalMult and the Growth of q
The operation ComposedEvalMult is simply the sequential execution of EvalMult, KeySwitch
and ModSwitch.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose c0, c1 are two ciphertexts encrypted under the public key h = g∗f−11 ,
both of degree 1. Correctness of ComposedEvalMult means
Dec(f2,ComposedEvalMult(c0, c1), 1) = Dec(f1, c0, 1) ∗Dec(f1, c1, 1),
where f2 is the new secret key after KeySwitch has been performed. To achieve this, we require
the polynomials f1, f2, g, r0, r1, e0, e1 and a¯ to all be drawn from a distribution χ so that their
largest coefficient is smaller than B, and that B satisfies
1
q′
(4p2n4B5 + nB
pq′
2
) <
q
2q′
.
Proof. Based on the proofs of propositions 4.2 and 4.3, it follows that
f2 ∗ ComposedEvalMult(c0, c1) ≡ b¯ mod q¯,
where b¯ = m0 ∗m1 mod p. What needs to be calculated is the bound we require on the drawn
polynomials so that the noise added during multiplication and switching keys is sufficiently
lowered by switching the modulus. The ciphertext ComposedEvalMult(c0, c1) outputs is on the
form c = 1q′ (a1→2 ∗ c0 ∗ c1 + ∆) for a factor q′ of q. We have the following:
f2 ∗ c = f2 ∗ 1
q′
(a1→2 ∗ c0 ∗ c1 + ∆)
=
1
q′
f2 ∗ (a¯ ∗ f−12 ∗ f21 ∗ (pr0 ∗ g ∗ f−11 + e0)(pr1 ∗ g ∗ f−11 + e1) + ∆)
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= . . . ≡ 1
q′
(p2a¯ ∗ r0 ∗ r1 ∗ g2 + pa¯ ∗ r0 ∗ g ∗ f1 ∗ e1
+ pa¯ ∗ r1 ∗ g ∗ f1 ∗ e0 + a¯ ∗ f21 ∗ e0 ∗ e1 + f2 ∗∆) = b′ ≡ b¯ mod q¯.
We need ‖b′‖∞ < q¯/2, so b′ = b¯. To achieve a bound on the coefficients of the polynomials, we
use Lemma 2.1 and set
‖a¯‖∞ = ‖r0‖∞ = ‖r1‖∞ = ‖g‖∞ = ‖f1‖∞ = ‖f2‖∞ = ‖e0‖∞ = ‖e1‖∞ = B,
and we compute:
‖b′‖∞ ≤ 1
q′
(p2n4B5 + 2pn4B5 + n4B5 + nB‖∆‖∞)
≤ 1
q′
(4p2n4B5 + nB
pq′
2
), (6)
which has to be smaller than q2q′ if ComposedEvalMult is to be correct.
Given this final bound all the coefficients of the noise-inducing polynomials need to satisfy,
we may use this to at last derive a bound on q. This bound will depend on other parameters
of the scheme and the probability distribution χ.
Suppose any of the polynomials affecting the noise level are drawn from a discrete Gaussian
distribution of parameter r, and set w as an assurance measure; meaning it should be practically
impossible for any polynomial drawn from this distribution to have a Euclidean length greater
than rw. It follows that we may set a bound on the infinity norm of any such distributed
polynomial as rw√
n
. Using this bound and expression (6), we require
1
q′
(4p2n4(
rw√
n
)5 + n
rw√
n
pq′
2
) =
1
q′
(4p2n1.5r5w5 +
1
2
pq′
√
n rw) < q/2q′
for decryption to still be correct after a call to ComposedEvalMult.
Suppose 4p2n1.5r5w5 < q′, we then have 1 + 12p
√
n rw < q/2q′, where the value q/q′ ≥ q1, a
single factor of q, and thus the smallest possible ciphertext modulus. In theory, q could have a
factor q1 significantly smaller than the rest, as we could set this as the final ciphertext modulus,
which would not be subjected to a modulus switching. We would therefore only require such
a factor to be large enough to decrypt ciphertexts that have been subjected to D modulus
switchings. A more practical approach however, is to set the following universal bound for any
factor of q, as the authors of [7] do:
qi > 4p
2r5w5n1.5. (7)
We may therefore conclude that ensuring any factor of q satisfies bound (7) results in an
encryption scheme which reduces the noise sufficiently to guarantee correct decryption of any
freshly generated ciphertext and output of ComposedEvalMult, given that the input ciphertexts
has at most the same noise level as any freshly generated ciphertexts for the current ciphertext
modulus q¯. As a result, q should satisfy the following lower bound, as anything else might result
in decryption failure:
q > (4p2r5w5n1.5)D+1. (8)
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5 Subfield Lattice Attack on the NTRU-based
Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
5.1 Applicability and Success of the Attack
It remains to be shown that the attack of section 3 is at all applicable to the scheme in section
4, and also that it will be successful.
We note first that the authors of [1] state in particular that Heuristic 3.1 holds for the
Gaussian distribution, which is the distribution suggested by the authors of [7] for the encryption
scheme. It is therefore possible to apply the attack on this scheme.
However, as noted in the last paragraph of subsection 2.3, an attack based on solving SVP or
approximate-SVP for the lattice LNTRU rests on the assumption that [f, g] is among the shortest
vectors in this lattice. We therefore need this assumption to hold, if the attack described in
section 3 is to produce a vector which may be used as a secret key. As the following proposition
shows, the necessary assumption holds:
Proposition 5.1. With overwhelming probability, the vector [f, g] is one of the shortest vectors
in the lattice LNTRU.
Proof. Recall Theorem 2.4: the length of the shortest vector in any lattice L is at most√
η det(L)1/η. In the case of LNTRU, we get ‖v0‖ ≤
√
2n (qn)1/2n =
√
2nq .
We may in addition calculate a bound on ‖[f, g]‖, using the upper bound ‖f‖∞, ‖g‖∞ <√
q
4pn , derived in the proof of Proposition 4.1:
‖[f, g]‖ =
√
f20 + . . . f
2
n−1 + g
2
0 + · · ·+ g2n−1 ≤
√
2n
(√ q
4pn
)2
=
√
q
2p
.
Comparing the two bounds, we have:
√
q
2p
/√
2nq =
√
1
4pn  1. Thus, seeing as the bound
on ‖[f, g]‖ is much smaller than the Hermite bound, it is highly probable that [f, g] is one of
the shortest vectors in LNTRU.
Thus, the attack is applicable to the scheme at hand, and will produce a vector usable as a
secret key should it be successful.
With regards to the success of the attack: recall bound (2) of subsection 3.2:
βΘ(n/βρ)(nσ)Θ(ρ) ≤ q,
which needs to be satisfied if the attack is to succeed. This is obviously more likely as q grows in
relation to n - in other words, the more factors q consists of, allowing for more CompEvalMult
operations to be performed.
If we wish to allow for D modulus switchings to be applied - meaning at most D multi-
plications are possible without calling on bootstrapping to reduce the noise - q will be of size
(4p2r5w5n1.5)D+1, in accordance with bound (8). The success of the attack therefore depends
on whether or not these parameters force q to satisfy bound (2). As the next subsection shows,
the attack is successful for an extensive range of parameters, and setting the parameters in such
a way that the attack fails results in a rather impractical encryption scheme.
12
A Successful Subfield Lattice Attack on a FHE Scheme Martha Norberg Hovd
5.2 Results
The authors of [1] also carried out experiments to test their attack on actual systems, which is a
necessity due to lack of understanding of the nature of the basis reduction algorithms LLL and
BKZ. The experimental attacks were carried out on NTRU bases over the ringR = Z[x]/(xn+1),
for n a power of 2 - meaning the experimental results are transferable to the scheme presented
here. We may therefore employ the experimental data given in [1] on the scheme to judge how
successful such an attack may be. We set the following values: p = 2, r = w = 6, which are the
parameter values the authors of [7] suggest.
For example, a successful attack was carried out in 3.5 hours for n = 211 when log(q) ≥ 165,
which in the given scheme corresponds to D = 3, for q = (4p2r5w5n1.5)D+1. To achieve the
same success by running BKZ on the full lattice (that is, not exploiting the possibility of using
the sub-field strategy), one would have to run BKZ with block size 27 to achieve δ = 1.0141. For
this block-size, BKZ is still considered practical, and the subfield lattice attack might therefore
not be too big an improvement in this specific instance [2].
The highest dimension the attack was carried out in was n = 212, with success for log(q)
as low as 190, yet again corresponding to D = 3, with the same parameter values as previous.
This attack took 120 hours; a direct attack on the full lattice would require running BKZ with
block size 131 to achieve δ = 1.0081, an attack that seems unfeasible at this point, as β = 131
is much too large a block-size to be practical [2].
It follows from these utilizations of the attack that the scheme must be considered insecure if
the scheme is also to make meaningful use of the noise reduction strategies presented. Note also
that the subfield attacks used LLL to reduce the subfield basis. Therefore it seems reasonable to
expect better attacks if BKZ was used on these bases instead, as BKZ consistently outperforms
LLL.
6 Conclusions
It has been shown that a subfield lattice attack described in [1] may be applied to an NTRU-
based fully homomorphic encryption scheme presented in [7]. It has also been shown that the
attack requires the integer parameter q of the encryption scheme to satisfy a lower bound in
order to be successful. At the same time, utilization of necessary operations that reduce the level
of noise in a ciphertext also requires q to satisfy a second lower bound, which is typically much
larger than the one required for the attack to be applicable. For this to not be the case and the
scheme to be safe from the attack, the parameters of the scheme make it very impractical, and
essentially unusable, as it would result in a scheme overly dependent on bootstrapping. Thus,
we must conclude that the susceptibility of the described attack is inevitable, for all intents and
purposes, if the scheme is to make meaningful use of its noise reducing operations.
Further work may include carrying out the subfield lattice attack with BKZ instead of LLL,
as this may improve the attack further. It is also possible that this may affect the security of
other schemes based on NTRU.
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